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In May, 2000, a conference convened to examine the decisionmaking process that leads 
sub-state groups engaged in armed resistance to develop new operational methods.  The 
conference was particularly concerned to understand whether such groups would engage in 
cyberterrorism, including the conditions under which they might try to cause mass disruption of 
information systems.  The conference also examined whether such groups would try to cause 
mass casualties, particularly through the use of chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear 
(CBRN) weapons.   
 
The conference, organized by the Center on Terrorism and Irregular Warfare of the Naval 
Postgraduate School, with the assistance of the Centre de Recherche sur les Menaces Criminelles 
Contemporaines of the University of Paris (II), was unprecedented in that its participants 
included former and active members of terrorist groups, as well as a hacker.  It was equally 
unprecedented in the amount of time within and outside the formal structure of the conference 
that investigators were able to spend with these unique participants and in the opportunity to 
work with them through a series of problems in a controlled simulation.  Together these 
characteristics made the conference an unique opportunity to learn about terrorism. 
 
The conference reached five principle conclusions: 
 
1.  The practitioners in the conference did not use information technology to cause mass 
disruption.  They sought to inflict mass casualties only in one narrowly defined situation. 
 
2.  Because sub-state groups with political objectives have reasons to limit the casualties they 
cause, these groups may find cyberterror an attractive non-lethal weapon. 
 
3.  By making it easier for sub-state groups to get their message out, the information and 
communication revolution may lessen the need for violence. 
 
4.  Judging from the small sample represented at the conference, terrorists have not yet integrated 
information technology into their strategy and tactics.  
 
5.  Again based on the small sample represented at the conference, significant barriers between 
hackers and terrorists may prevent their integration in one group. 
 
6.  Although sub-state groups with political objectives have strong incentives not to use force 
indiscriminately and to avoid attacks that cause mass casualties, a politically motivated group 
can find itself in a situation where its weakness and isolation make a mass casualty attack a 
rational choice. 
 
ii   
  Fuller statements of these conclusions are set off in highlighted boxes in the body of the 
report for easy reference.  
This report details the reasoning that leads to these conclusions.  It also explains how they 
confirm or amend previous research on cyberterrorism.  Finally, the report offers an assessment 
of innovation in terrorist groups, developing a better profile of which kinds of groups will be 
innovative and under what circumstances.  This is an issue essential to any effort to determine 
which groups under which circumstances might turn to cyberterrorism and mass casualty attacks.  
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In May, 2000, a conference convened to examine the decisionmaking process that leads 
sub-state groups engaged in armed resistance to develop new operational methods.1  The 
conference was particularly concerned to understand whether such groups would engage in 
cyberterrorism,2 including the conditions under which they might try to cause mass disruption of 
information systems.  The conference also examined whether such groups would try to cause 
mass casualties, particularly through the use of chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear 
(CBRN) weapons.   
 
The conference was unprecedented in that its participants included former and active 
members of terrorist groups, as well as a hacker.  It was equally unprecedented in the amount of 
time within and outside the formal structure of the conference that investigators were able to 
spend with these unique participants and in the opportunity to work with them through a series of 
problems in a controlled simulation.  Together these characteristics made the conference an 
unique opportunity to learn about terrorism. 
 
This report first describes the participants in the conference and its structure and then the 
conference results.  It follows this section with a discussion of the degree to which the results of 
the conference can be trusted, given the unique character of its participants.  The report 
concludes with some suggestions for further research.  Appendix A contains a transcript of the 
conference.  Appendix B contains excerpts from Cyberterrorism, Prospects and Implications,3 a 
previous report of the Center on Terrorism and Irregular Warfare.  These excerpts will assist the 
reader in understanding the results of the conference and how they modify two conclusions of 
 
1 The conference was organized by the Center on Terrorism and Irregular Warfare of the Naval Postgraduate School, 
with the assistance of the Centre de Recherche sur les Menaces Criminelles Contemporaines of the University 
Pantheon-Assas (Paris II). 
2 Cyberterrorism is the unlawful destruction or disruption of digital property in order to intimidate or coerce 
governments or societies in pursuit of goals that are political, religious or ideological.  For a fuller discussion, see 
Cyberterror, Prospects and Implications, Center on Terrorism and Irregular Warfare (Monterey, California:  July, 
1999), pp. 7-18. 
3 See the reference in footnote 2 above. 
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  the earlier study.  Appendix C provides information that was given to participants at the 
beginning of the simulation.  
 
Participants and Structure 
 
Five individuals with experience in violent sub-state groups plus a hacker (hereafter 
referred to as practitioners) participated in the conference.  One practitioner came from the PLO 
(currently serving in the Palestinian Authority); two from the Basque Fatherland and Liberty-
Political/Military (ETA-PM); one from the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE); and one 
from the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC).  All of the practitioners who were 
or are members of organizations had or have decisionmaking roles in those organizations.  The 
hacker had substantial experience attacking information systems.  These practitioners were 
joined by 11 academics, including several of the leading authorities on terrorism, and a UN 
official, who has done extensive research on suicide bombing in the Middle East.  
 
All discussions at the conference were conducted under a provision of non-attribution.  
Comments made at the conference may be used but without attributing them to any participant. 
     
 During the first day of the conference, four academics and two practitioners made 
presentations.  Each presentation was followed by discussion.  
 
Academic  “Innovation in Strategies of Conflict” 
PLO-PA  “Dismantling the Abu Nidal Organization”   
Academic  “To Escalate or Not to Escalate? Factors Determining Insurgent Group  
    Decisions to Increase the level of Violence” 
Academic  “Bonding and Discipline in Direct Action Units: A  Cross-Cultural  
    Inquiry”  
ETA-PM  “The Decision of ETA-PM to Halt Violence” 
Academic  “The Effect of Government Responses to an     
    Insurgency” 
 
During the second day of the conference, the organizers split the participants into three 
groups for a simulation based on the current situation in Chechnya.  One group was the Chechen 
resistance in Chechnya, the second was a group of Chechens and sympathizers based in Moscow 
and the third was a control team that played the Russian government, the rest of the world and, 
for the Chechen team based in Chechnya, a Moscow Chechen resistance cell.  An academic 
chaired the Chechen team based in Chechnya, which also included the two former ETA-PM 
members, the FARC representative and the hacker.  The PLO-PA representative chaired the 
Chechen group based in Moscow, which also contained the former LTTE member.  The two 
Chechen groups were asked to develop strategies based on their situations and resources.  The 
simulation was played in three sessions.  In the first, the two groups were allowed to develop 
their strategies without interference or provocation from the control group.  In response to these 
strategies, the control group increased the pressure in each of the succeeding two sessions and, in 
the last session, introduced the possibility of using a chemical weapon.  Pressure on the groups 
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  was increased by telling them, for example, that world opinion was largely indifferent to their 
struggle, that there was a media blackout imposed by the Russians, and that the Russians had 
begun to deport Chechens and resettle Russians in Chechnya.  One of the groups was given the 
opportunity to use information technology in the second session of the simulation.  The 
simulation was structured in this way to see what the participants would do on their own and 
then to see how far they would escalate under increasing pressure and provocation.  
  
The third day of the conference began with the teams preparing reports on lessons learned 
from the simulation.  These reports were then presented to a plenary session of the participants 
and discussed.  The conference concluded with some final remarks from one of the ETA-PM 




 The papers presented at the conference, the discussions that occurred throughout its three 
days and, above all, the simulation led to important results concerning the likelihood of mass 
disruption and mass casualty attacks.   They also suggested a number of other important findings 
about cyberterrorism.  We present the mass casulaty and cyberterrorism results first (1-5 below) 
and then mass casualties (6 below).   
 
1.  The practitioners in the conference did not use information technology to cause mass 
disruption.  The reasoning and approach of the practioners throughout the conference supported 
the conventional wisdom that politically motivated terrorists have reasons to target selectively 
and to limit the effects of their operations.  
 
2.  Because sub-state groups with political objectives have reasons to limit the casualties they 
cause, these groups may find cyberterror an attractive non-lethal weapon. 
 
3.  By making it easier for sub-state groups to get their message out, the information and 
communication revolution may lessen the need for violence. 
 
4.  Judging from the small sample represented at the conference, terrorists have not yet integrated 
information technology into their strategy and tactics.  
 
5.  Again based on the small sample represented at the conference, significant barriers between 
hackers and terrorists may prevent their integration in one group. 
 
6.  Although sub-state groups with political objectives have strong incentives not to use force 
indiscriminately and to avoid attacks that cause mass casualties, a politically motivated group 
can find itself in a situation where its weakness and isolation make a mass casualty attack a 
rational choice. 
 
 We will discuss each of these conclusions in turn.  Summary statements of them can be 
found at the end of each of the following sections in highlighted boxes.  
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1.  Causing Mass Disruption Is not a Useful Tactic 
 
During the simulation, one of the practitioners commented repeatedly that his goal was 
not just to kill people but to create fear, panic and chaos (pp. 77, 78, 85, 86, 89, 91).4  It was not 
violence that he cared about, as much as the psychological reaction to it.  This was the best way 
to get attention for his cause.  This approach suggests that politically motivated terrorists might 
want to use information technology to cause mass disruption, since this would appear to be a 
good way to cause fear and panic.  The simulation at the conference suggested several reasons 
why this would not be the case.  One of the simulation groups authorized an attack on the 
Russian Stock Exchange.  This attack initially created the sentiment in the group that they might 
have gone too far and risked creating a backlash.  Ultimately, especially after one practitioner 
pointed out the benefits of the attack and placed it in the context of their situation, they decided 
they had not (p. 62).  But if an attack on one stock exchange created this fear of a backlash or 
loss of legitimacy, then an effort at mass disruption would seem even more likely to and thus not 
be acceptable.  In addition, agreement to authorize the attack was based on the understanding 
that participation in the stock exchange was an elite activity and thus that disrupting it would not 
affect most Russians (pp. 59, 61).  The attack was appealing, then, because it was carefully 
targeted at a small segment of the Russian population, an attack on which might be popular with 
Russians at large.  Mass disruption would be contrary to this reasoning.  Also, the practitioner 
who argued that the attack was a success was from the most ideologically anti-capitalist group 
represented at the conference.  He liked the attack on the stock exchange for its symbolic value.  
While mass disruption would obviously attack e-commerce, it would also strike at many 
organizations sympathetic to at least some of the goals of the anti-capitalist group, if not the 
means it was using to achieve them.  In sum, mass disruption appears to be too indiscriminate for 
politically motivated groups.  Finally, as we will discuss in detail below, one of the principal 
appeals of information technology to politically motivated terrorists is the powerful assistance it 
provides for getting their message out.  These terrorists are likely to think twice about attempting 
mass disruption, then, since it could make the vital task of informing the world more difficult. 
 
Mass disruption is not well suited to the objectives or operational approach of politically 
motivated terrorists.  They will have good reasons not to engage in such attacks and to 
prefer more focused and selective attacks on information targets.   
 
2.  Cyberterror May Be an Attractive Non-Lethal Weapon  
 
In order to understand why terrorist groups with political objectives may find cyberterror 
an attractive non-lethal weapon, we must consider why such groups want to limit the amount of 
bloodshed they cause.  The conventional wisdom about terrorists with political objectives is that 
they use violence as a way of getting attention, not as an end in itself.  This idea is neatly 
                                                 
4 Unless otherwise noted, page number references in the text are to the transcript of the conference in Appendix A. 
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expressed in Brian Jenkins’ often quoted aphorism that “terrorists want a lot of people watching 
and a lot of people listening and not a lot of people dead.”5  The reason that terrorists want 
attention and not deaths is that their undertaking is a political one.  They want an audience to 
listen to their claims and demands and, in the best case, to become sympathetic to them.  
Terrorist violence, of course, has an undeniably coercive component.  It is meant to instill fear 
and to intimidate.  But this violence can go too far.  Too much violence, too many deaths or too 
many of the wrong kind (children, for example), risks alienating any possible sympathizers and 
making any level of action against the terrorists seem justified.  Underlying these calculations 
about the effective level of violence is an understanding of the common revulsion at wanton 
killing.  If a group and its political objectives are to have any chance of acquiring and 
maintaining legitimacy in the eyes of the world at large, it must not appear to kill wantonly.  Its 
use of violence must be proportionate to some threat.  
 
This reasoning does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that politically motivated 
terrorist violence will be small-scale.  If the threat is great, the violence could be great.  One of 
the former members of ETA-PM argued at the conference, for example, that the repression of the 
Franco government was so great and posed such a threat to the Basque people that they could 
tolerate a lot of violence being done in their name (p. 24).  In at least one interview, Osama bin 
Ladin seemed to argue that he was justified in using weapons of mass destruction against 
Americans because this was a proportionate response to the threat that the United States posed to 
Islam and the Holy Land.6  In addition, a terrorist group can undertake by itself or through a 
political apparatus a public information campaign to make the public more accepting of violence 
against the state and its representatives and institutions.  ETA did this as it escalated its attacks, 
according to one former member (p. 23).  It is also possible that a terrorist organization could 
mistake what public opinion will tolerate.  It might think that its public audience would accept a 
certain level of violence, perpetrate an attack that produces it and then find out it was wrong.  If 
it makes this mistake, an organization is likely to lose support.7   As a participant in the 
conference made clear, ETA split in the early 1980s over such judgments about public opinion 
(p. 33-34).  Again, over time an organization might become less concerned with winning over 
public opinion and rely solely on coercion and intimidation to maintain the minimum level of 
support necessary to conduct its operations.  While at this point functioning like a criminal 
enterprise rather than a terrorist group, such an organization might be willing to commit extreme 
forms of violence.  For these reasons, the conventional wisdom about terrorist groups with 
political objectives does not mean that the violence they produce will always be small-scale.  
Yet, the critical point in the conventional wisdom is still valid:  any group that seeks to build 
legitimacy or public support must commit acts of violence that the public perceives to be 
proportionate and justifiable. 
    
 
5 On the conventional wisdom and some reasons why it may no longer apply, see Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism 
(New York:  Columbia University Press, 1998), pp. 198-205. 
6 Jamal Ismail, “I Am Not Afraid of Death,” Newsweek, January 11, 1999, p. 37.  Consider also the discussion of bin 
Ladin in the conference, Transcript, p. 18. 
7 This appears to have happened to Islamic terrorists in Algeria and Egypt.  See Fawaz A. Gerges, “The Decline of 
Revolutionary Islam in Algeria and Egypt,” Survival 41 (Spring, 1999), 113-125 
5   
  
                                                
Substantiating this line of reasoning is the fact that the practitioners at the conference 
used the term “terrorist” to describe only those who killed indiscriminately (cf. pp. 9 and 105).  
Their more measured use of violence fell below that threshold.  They used only that level of 
violence necessary to make their cause known and to increase the pressure to meet their 
demands, without ultimately endangering the legitimacy of those demands.  (Consider the 
comments of the practitioners on pp. 14, 50, 60, 64, 73, 78-79, 89-90, 104).  This supports the 
argument that those who participate in sub-state groups that use political violence see it as an 
instrument rather than an end in itself and use it according to some rules of proportionality. 
 
The courses of action developed in the simulations at the conference further support this 
line of argument.  With one important exception (discussed below, pp.16-18), in keeping with 
their experience in nationalist and revolutionary movements and the circumstances of the 
scenario, the practitioners treated violence as instrumental.  They insisted that the struggles they 
had been involved in and the one presented in the scenario were above all political struggles 
(e.g., p. 59).  All efforts, including all uses of violence, had to be subordinated to the political 
objective of the struggle.  This meant that the ultimate objective was to win domestic and 
international support.  This meant, in turn, close and constant attention to public and 
international opinion.  Violence was acceptable if it could be made to appear legitimate, that is, if 
it was proportionate, for example, to the level of perceived repression (pp. 66-67, 92, 105-106).  
The assumption was that this proportionate use of violence would win more public support or 
attention than it lost.  Thus, both of the Chechen groups in the simulation initially targeted 
government officials, arguing that this was a better tactic than killing the public indiscriminately 
(p. 54-55, 70-71).  Among government officials, both groups tended at first to agree that 
targeting corrupt officials or those plausibly associated with human rights violations was a better 
tactic than killing government officials indiscriminately (pp. 50, 70).  In this light, it was 
interesting that a relatively old-fashioned tactic, kidnapping, received support in both groups and 
particularly the one based in Chechnya.  One practitioner in this group appeared to be following 
the logic of the conventional wisdom when he argued that a kidnapping was better than a 
bombing because a kidnapping lasts longer, produces more publicity, and creates the possibility 
of negotiations, which confer legitimacy on the sub-state group, while keeping violence to a 
minimum.  The hostage, he informed the group, could always be released unharmed (p. 65). 
 
The conference, then, confirmed the conventional wisdom about violent sub-state groups 
with political objectives.  Such groups want people paying attention and not dead.  For this 
reason, cyberterror may be an attractive non-lethal weapon.  In the simulation, the group based in 
Chechnya wanted to use information technology to attack infrastructure, as a way of dramatizing 
its message without killing people.  A noted above, it was able to use such technology to shut 
down the Russian stock market.8  When they were told that this act had caused great concern in 
Russia and in political and financial capitals around the world, the group concluded that this 
action had been a great success (p. 62).  It got them attention but did not cause concern about 
 
8 The group was told that members of the Chechen diaspora in the Middle East had offered through reliable 
intermediaries to attack the Russian Stock Exchange and the Ministry of Defense.  
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  fatalities or casualties inflicted.  It appeared to provide significant political benefits, then, 
without threatening high political costs.  
  
 With this line of reasoning in mind we should recall the comments of the practitioner 
mentioned above.  If it is not violence but the psychological reaction that is important to a 
terrorist, then cyberterrorism should be deemed a useful tool.  Mass disruption might be too 
indiscriminate but more selective attacks should still be useful.  They could generate panic 
without causing bloodshed and so limit any possible backlash.  
 
We should note, however, that as with traditional kinds of terrorist attacks, reasons for 
restraint with information attacks do not mean that terrorists will always be selective in their 
targetting or choose small-scale targets.  As discussed above, extreme repression, miscalculation 
or transformation into a criminal enterprise might lead even nationalist or revolutionary groups 
to undertake larger-scale attacks.  Generally speaking, however, groups with political 
motivations will have reasons to target selectively and not engage in mass disruption. 
 
Cyberterror will also appeal to groups, the simulation suggested, because it will keep 
operational as well as political costs low.  All of the practitioners at the conference were more 
aware than the academics of the costs of undertaking clandestine violent activity.  This was most 
apparent in the Moscow group, which was under the most pressure.  Both practitioners 
continually pointed out to the academics the difficulties and dangers involved in what they were 
proposing to do:  suicide bombing might be an effective tactic but it is hard to find people willing 
to do it and requires more complicated logistics; if members of the Moscow group carry out 
suicide attacks, trained and trusted personnel would be lost without any guarantee that they could 
be replaced (p. 75, 91, 99-100); hostage-taking may be a useful tactic but imposes significant 
operational requirements on the group undertaking it (p. 98); surveillance consumes vast 
amounts of time and personnel (pp. 7, 83); LAWs and stingers can be effective weapons but 
transporting them in a city as tightly controlled as Moscow will likely lead to arrests rather than 
effective operations (p. 99); simultaneous operations might be more attention-getting but they are 
extremely difficult to coordinate (p.81).  In short, the practitioners were acutely conscious of the 
costs of conducting operations.  Anything that can lower those costs, therefore, should 
recommend itself to them.  Information technology offers that possibility.  It can be used 
remotely, thus lowering the cost of maintaining security.  Surveillance on the web can be 
automated to some extent, saving personnel costs, and done anonymously, lowering security 
costs.  The materiel needed is small and easily transported, which lowers financial and security 
costs.  For clandestine sub-state groups, which are chronically short of resources and vitally 
concerned with security, information technology would appear to offer significant advantages. 
 
A previous report on cyberterrorism, Cyberterror, Prospects and Implications (hereafter 
CPI), reached some conclusions similar to those drawn from the conference.  For example, CPI 
also concluded that politically motivated terrorists would be unlikely to engage in mass 
disruption (CPI, pp. 49, 52).  The conference results also confirm other conclusions that this 
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  report reached about the kinds of terrorists at the conference (ethno-nationalist separatists and 
revolutionaries).9  As the analysis has indicated so far, it confirms that  
 
1.  Attacks on infrastructure appeal to politically motivated terrorists (CPI, p. 45); 
2.  Cyberterrorism would allow terrorists to gain publicity without alienating supporters with 
excessive violence but the unintended effects of cyber attacks might discourage groups from 
using them (CPI, p. 47); 
3.  Revolutionary or anti-capitalist terrorists would use cyberterrorism for focused attacks on  
governments and corporations (CPI, p. 52). 
 
About point two above it should be noted that, at least based on the sample attending the 
conference, thinking about the use of information technology among terrorists has not advanced 
far enough so that their calculations about the utility of cyberterrorism sufficiently take into 
account unintended consequences.  This is an issue to which we return below.  
 
 
                                                
In addition to the three conclusions listed above, CPI reached two other conclusions 
concerning politically motivated terrorists.  It concluded that  
 
4.  Given the costs of acquiring a sound technical capability, groups operating within a disputed 
territory would probably stay with traditional terrorist operations, while those operating outside 
the disputed territory would be more likely to use cyberterrorism to launch attacks into the 
disputed territory and against “the critical infrastructure of international supporters of the 
incumbent regime (when the selected targets are not in the immediate area of operations, 
cyberterror attacks offer reduced vulnerability and potentially more efficient use of resources”) 
(CPI, p.46); 
5.  A group operating in a country with minimal dependence on information systems and limited 
connectivity would find cyberterrorism less attractive (CPI, p.48); 
 
 As the analysis so far has made clear, the results of the conference suggest that these 
conclusions need to be amended. 
   
Point four is that the costs of acquiring more than a rudimentary cyberterrorism capability 
might encourage groups to remain with traditional terrorist techniques when operating 
domestically, while using cyberterrorism internationally.  This preference for using 
cyberterrorism for international attacks derives from the presumed higher costs of these attacks 
(organizing and supporting attacks from overseas is more difficult, perhaps impossibly more 
difficult, than organizing and supporting them locally), which would make the investment to 
have this capability a reasonable one.  While the simulation gave the participants the capability 
to use or authorize the use of information technology for free, and thus cannot offer a definitive 
assessment of what terrorists would be willing to pay for what degree of this capability, the 
 
9 Since ethno-nationalist and revolutionary terrorists were the only kind present at the conference, its results do not 
apply to the other kinds of terrorists discussed in CPI:  far right extremists or religious or New Age terrorists.  
Questions about these groups can be addressed only by further research.  See Suggestions for Further Research 
below.  
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earlier report probably failed to assess fully the costs to terrorists of traditional techniques, that 
is, of operating without information technology.  In other words, sitting with the practitioners 
and listening to them work through operational problems highlighted their concern with the costs 
of traditional terrorist activities.  These costs are so high from the perspective of the terrorists 
that they should be willing to invest significantly in technologies and expertise that would lower 
them, especially for their domestic operations, where at least security costs are likely to be higher 
than for international operations.  Terrorist groups may be even more likely to make this 
investment because, as noted above, the conference suggested they will not need to have the 
greatest and most expensive cyberterror capability (what the earlier report called a complex-
coordinated capability),10 which would allow them to cause mass disruption.  Instead, they are 
likely to be satisfied with an advanced-structured capability, which “is the level where 
cyberterror attack becomes realistic as a primary method of attack.” (CPI, p. 81)   As with any 
investment in new technology, investing in cyberterrorism would be a gamble but, given its 
potentially great benefits, one that terrorists may well be willing to make.  Even acquiring 
rudimentary capabilities for attack might be appealing, although as CPI made clear (CPI, p. 47) 
such capabilities can be easily countered and may not rise above the noise level of non-terrorist 
hacker activity.     
 
 Point five is that cyberterrorism will be less attractive in countries with less connectivity 
and dependence on information systems.  This proved not to be the case in the simulation.  
Saying that a country is not dependent on information systems or well-connected is tantamount 
to saying that cyber activity in that country is an elite phenomenon.  As an elite phenomenon, it 
is an attractive target to any group trying to build broad popular support.  Attacking the elite will 
not effect the mass of people and may even be popular with the mass.  As noted previously, these 
assumptions lay behind the attack on the Russian Stock Exchange in the simulation. 
Furthermore, the lack of connectivity in a country serves to insulate people from the unintended 
consequences of a cyber attack.  Since, as noted above, CPI offered these unintended 
consequences as something that might discourage terrorists from using information technology 
in their attacks, limited dependence on information systems and low rates of connectivity might 
actually encourage cyber attacks rather than discourage them. 
 
 The utility of cyberterror as a non-lethal weapon was highlighted by the FARC member 
in his comments in the after-action session on the simulation.  “Through a friendly hacker we 
were able to bring down the information technology at the Moscow stock exchange.  It had to 
stop work for one day and this had an enormous effect outside Russia.  So any attack using the 








10 Appendix B contains excerpts from Cyberterror, Prospects and Implications defining these levels of capability. 
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The conference results suggest that ethno-nationalist and revolutionary terrorist groups 
will find cyberterrorism appealing as a non-lethal weapon because it will allow them to 
achieve their objective (more attention to their cause) while lowering their political and 
operational costs.   Amending earlier work on cyberterrorism, the conference results 
also suggest that an array of groups (both the resource poor and rich) in a variety of 
situations (operating domestically as well as internationally, in countries of low 
connectivity and high) could find cyberterrorism useful.   
 
3.  Information Technology May Lessen the Need for Violence 
 
The discussion of information technology has so far focused on its use as a non-lethal 
weapon.  The conference also highlighted the importance of information technology as a means 
of communicating a message.  This aspect is arguably more important than the use of 
cyberterrorism as a non-lethal weapon, since for terrorists with political objectives, violence is 
ultimately only a means to get attention for the cause. 
 
In his presentation to the conference on the first day, one of the ETA-PM practitioners 
argued that the new information technology meant that violence was less important than it had 
been in the past (p. 23).  The purpose of violence was to get attention but this could now be done 
more effectively than in the past through new information and communication technology, which 
governments could not control.  As non-violent means of propagating the message increased, the 
need for violent means decreased.  In the simulation, when informed by the control team that the 
Russians had removed all foreign media from Chechnya, this practitioner was not concerned.  
Chechen web pages in the Middle East and Europe, e-mail, and video footage would get the 
story out and, he was convinced, the Russians could not prevent this.  Other members of this 
group called for better information campaigns and similarly assumed that they could 
communicate with their intended audience (pp. 62-64).  
 
There are limits to this argument.  Putting information in front of people does not mean 
that they will pay attention to  it.  Violence forces people and governments to pay attention and 
respond.  Ibrahim Rugova pled the Kosovars case non-violently but the international community 
did nothing.  When the Kosovo Liberation Army began its attacks and the Serbs responded, the 
international community got involved.11  More web pages, e-mails or video footage or their more 
savvy use might have garnered Rugova more support but this is far from certain.  The Zapatistas 
are generally considered sophisticated users of the new media and this has gotten them support.  
Yet, they have used force and military trappings as part of their campaign and their international 
support has not really spread beyond a limited circle of concerned citizens and non-governmental 
organizations.  It has not translated into support from other governments, who apparently believe 
                                                 
11 Ivo H. Daalder and Michael E. O’Hanlon, Winning Ugly, NATO’s War to Save Kosovo (Washington:  The 
Brookings Institution, 2000), pp. 10, 186. 
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  that the costs of providing this support have remained higher than its perceived benefits, or 
given them decisive leverage against the government in Mexico City.  The same would probably 
have been true in Kosovo, even if Rugova had run a more sophisticated information campaign. 
 
The practitioner acknowledged these limits.  He did not claim that violence would no 
longer be necessary.  He insisted, however, that if he were building a movement today, it would 
require less violence than it did when he began his clandestine activities over 25 years ago.  First, 
he mentioned the success that non-governmental organizations have had with non-violent web-
based campaigns.  Second, he argued that building or maintaining ethnic or national group 
cohesion would be easier today with modern communications and would require less violence, 
even in the face of an oppressive government.12  
   
On balance, there is probably some merit to the practitioner’s argument.  Clearly, there 
could be a level of government repression that would nullify, if not entirely the use, then the 
effectiveness of the new means of communication.  Just as clearly, the new means of 
communication allow sub-state groups to organize resources for resistance, including domestic 
and international public opinion, in ways that governments cannot stop.13  It therefore seems 
reasonable to conclude that, in those cases where a government has reason to resist a sub-state 
group but either not the means or the reason to impose a maximum level of repression, the 
information and communication revolutions may permit the sub-state group to achieve its goals 
with less violence than it would have used in the absence of these revolutions. 
 
 
In some circumstances (when the costs to a state of acknowledging the claims of a 
sub-state group are not too high), the information and communication revolutions may 
diminish the amount of violence necessary to mobilize sub-state resistance and 
achieve its objectives.     
 
 
4.  Terrorists Have Not Fully Integrated Information Technology into their Strategy and 
 Tactics 
 
The focus of the practitioners on political objectives and domestic and international 
opinion suggests that they would readily use information technology to further their cause.  This 
                                                 
12 Conference presentation (p. 23) and discussion with a member of the control team, May 15 and May 17, 2000.  
For the importance of group cohesion for movements of protest or rebellion, see Ted Robert Gurr, Minorities at 
Risk, A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts (Washington:  United States Institute of Peace, 1993), pp. 123-138, 
especially pp. 127-128, 131. 
13 Opposition to the government in Burma, having been chased from the cities, has organized itself in Burma and 
around the world from Burma’s jungles thanks to modern communications.  See Thomas Crampton, “Latest 
Technology Links Jungle Rebels, Wired Revolution Helps Guerillas,” International Herald Tribune (October 8, 
1999). 
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was not the case.  Only the practitioner discussed in the section above displayed a consistent 
and thorough understanding of how information technology might be used in sub-state conflicts, 
and his understanding was restricted to using this technology to convey information.  He did not 
display any understanding of how to use information technology as a weapon.  The other 
practitioners did not display even this much knowledge of information technology or how it 
might be used in a sub-state conflict.  When late in the scenario they were presented by the 
control team with the opportunity to launch cyber attacks against the Russians, the Chechen 
group based in Chechnya authorized the disruption of the Russian stock market, as already 
mentioned, and logistics data bases in the Russian Ministry of Defense.  They did this, however, 
only after the hacker in the group reminded them that the control team had presented them with 
this opportunity, the hacker brought it up again and the academics urged the group to do it and an 
academic once again  brought it up (pp.  57, 59).  The practitioners agreed to the attack without 
the kind of detailed analysis of how best to exploit operational possibilities or without the careful 
consideration of consequences provoked by other suggested operations.  None of the 
practitioners suggested, for example, that the ability to penetrate Russian information systems 
might be more valuable as a source of intelligence than as a weapon of disruption, even though 
the group had discussed previously its intelligence deficiencies and one of the practitioners had 
discussed using negotiations as a means of collecting intelligence (pp. 47, 49, 50, 52, 58, 60, 61).  
At the end of the simulation, it was an academic who was still trying to figure out new ways to 
use information attacks (p. 65).  In general, the practitioners did not show the familiarity with the 
tactical possibilities or strategic consequences of information technology that they showed with 
bombings, kidnappings, assassinations or other traditional insurgent and terrorist tactics. 
 
The hacker reached a similar estimation of the other practitioners at the conference.  
According to him, in private conversations they showed an interest in information technology as 
a weapon and a means of gathering or controlling information and familiarity with the 
possibilities of information technology beyond what the general public may have but no practical 
experience with it.14 
 
This attitude toward information technology is consistent with a general tendency of the 
practitioners in the simulation not to innovate, to be conservative tactically (characteristics that 
confirmed hypotheses developed in the first session of the conference, pp. 2-3) and to use 
violence carefully and selectively.  This conservative approach or reliance on traditional methods 
may have resulted from the fact that three of the six practitioners are retired, so to speak, and in 
two cases retired for almost twenty years.  On the other hand, the practitioner who is still 
involved (the FARC representative) was no more innovative than any of the other practitioners; 
the PLO-PA representative, who currently works in a position that would presumably keep him 
aware of more recent developments, did not display a more subtle grasp of the potential of 
information technology; and, finally, the practitioner who displayed the greatest awareness of the 
utility of information technology in information campaigns was one of the long retired 
 
14 Conversation with one of the conference organizers, May 18, 2000. 
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practitioners.  The conservative approach of the practitioners, therefore, may not be the result of 
their retired status but evidence for the claim that terrorists are tactically conservative.15  
  
The conference highlighted, then, a tension or gap between the evident advantages of 
cyberterrorism and an equally evident tendency on the part of terrorists not to innovate.   The 
critical question, then, is under what circumstances this gap might be bridged and cyberterrorism 
become a standard weapon in the repertoire of terrorists.  Discussions and the simulation pointed 
to the following conclusions:  
 
• All innovation is difficult and therefore rare.  
• Innovations are seldom completely new departures from past experience.  
• Tactical innovation probably occurs more readily than strategic innovation.   
• Thus, information technology is more likely to be used to do traditional things 
(getting the message out or attacking a symbol of wealth and power like a stock 
market) in new ways (setting up a web page or shutting down an information system 
rather than blowing up a building), than change fundamentally the character of sub-
state conflict (a new balance of violence and information manipulation). 
• Opportunities for innovation in the operating environment of a sub-state group are not 
necessarily more important for producing innovation than the decisionmaking process 
within the sub-state group.  
• Innovation is more likely to occur in smaller and newer organizations and under 
leaders who are entrepreneurial. 
   
In citing new and smaller organizations as those most likely to innovate, the conference 
agreed with a conclusion of CPI (p. 72) and, as far as cyberterrorism is concerned, with what the 
sketchy evidence reveals.16   
   
In emphasizing the importance of entrepreneurial leadership for innovation, however, the 
conference offered a correction to the discussion of this issue in CPI, which used the life-cycle 
model of organizations to understand innovation.  It was the view of the conference that although 
newer organizations are more likely to innovate than older organizations, not all such terrorist 
organizations do in fact innovate.  A more reliable indicator of innovation than the stage of a 
group’s development or the opportunities in its environment, according to conference 
participants, is the character of its decisionmaking.  The conference reached the conclusion that 
entrepreneurial leadership is the key to understanding terrorist innovation.  Opportunities to 
innovate may be present and an innovation, such as cyberterrorism, may offer significant 
benefits, but this does not mean innovation will occur.  These conditions may be necessary for 
 
15 Bruce Hoffman, “Responding to Terrorism Across the Technological Spectrum,” in John Arquilla and David 
Ronfeldt, In Athena’s Camp, Preparing for Conflict in the Information Age (Santa Monica:  RAND, 1997), pp. 340-
344. 
16 John Arquilla, David Ronfeldt, and Michele Zanini, “Information Age Terrorism,” Current History 99(April, 
2000), 183-185. 
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  innovation but they are not sufficient to bring it about.  An entrepreneurial leader must be 
present (p. 2).  
 
The conference cited Velupillai Prabhakaran, the head of the LTTE, as an example of a 
entrepreneurial leader.  In general, conference participants agreed that a group likely to innovate 
will have a leader who is very hard working, in complete control over his whole organization, 
accepts risk, has a lot of decisionmaking autonomy, and leads a cohesive and loyal organization 
(p. 7). 
  
Some discussion at the conference focused on whether resources were important for 
innovation (pp. 5, 7).  No definitive answer was reached on this issue but it appears unlikely that 
resource levels will have a decisive influence on innovation with cyberterrorism, at least among 
terrorists with political objectives.  First, resource levels do not appear to be decisive for 
innovation generally.17  Second, achieving an advanced-structured capability, which is what 
politically motivated terrorists seem most likely to want, is not that expensive (CPI, p. 86.).  
 
Terrorists have not fully integrated information technology into their strategy and 
tactics.  To the extent that they have used this technology, they have tended to use it 
as a better means of communicating rather than as a non-lethal weapon.  They have 
tended to innovate with information technology tactically rather than strategically.  
Smaller and newer organizations but above all those with entrepreneurial leadership 
are likely to lead the integration of information technology into terrorist tactics.    
 
 
5.  Significant Barriers May Prevent the Integration Of Hackers and Terrorists  
 
In addition to examining innovation in terrorist groups, the conference and in particular 
the simulation inadvertently exposed another important organizational issue relevant to 
cyberterrorism, whether terrorists and information technologists or hackers can work together. 
 
One of the simulation groups brought together the hacker, the FARC representative and 
the two ETA-PM members.  Although these four practitioners agreed in general on the critical 
strategic objective (acquire domestic and international legitimacy) they disagreed over tactics 
and had difficulty communicating, particularly in the first session.  This difficulty was so great 
that it led to a breakdown in the group.  The hacker and the terrorists were not able to work 
together.  If this breakdown can be generalized it would have obvious consequences for the 
development of cyberterrorism. 
 
                                                 
17 Stephen P. Rosen, Winning the Next War, Innovation and the Modern Military (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1991), pp. 3-4, 252. 
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  Since the conference and simulation were not set up to explore this problem and only 
one hacker was present at the conference, it is impossible to make any definitive statements 
about why this breakdown occurred.  The observations of other participants and discussions with 
the hacker permit some speculation. 
 
 Personality clashes were part of the problem but only part.  (For evidence of a 
personality clash, consider the exchanges at the beginning of the simulation between the hacker 
and the academic serving as the chairman of simulation group A, pp. 44-45).  As presentations 
and discussions at the conference suggested, this may have been in part a question of status (p. 
28).  The hacker was there as a practitioner but his standing as a practitioner was probably in 
doubt from the viewpoint of the other practitioners.  What status or standing does a manipulator 
of bytes at a remote and safe distance have in front of men who have planned and ordered 
bombings and killings and lived clandestine lives under the threat of torture and death (pp. 33, 
78, 82)?  To conduct cyberterrorism effectively, groups will need educated information 
technology specialists.  Such a degree of education would normally provide someone a 
significant status.  If that status is not accorded to these information technologists by terrorist 
groups, will they remain in these groups or function well in them? 
 
The differences between the hacker and the practitioners went beyond issues of status.  
They disagreed over tactics.  The practitioners quickly turned to the issue of how to use violence 
and whom to target.  The hacker’s approach was to look first at the opportunities for getting the 
group’s message out and how those opportunities might be increased.  The hacker did not oppose 
the practitioners’ use of selective violence, while the practitioners for their part agreed that 
getting their message out was critical.  The difference between the two was over tactical 
emphasis or priorities and the way this different emphasis was expressed.  The hacker spoke in 
theoretical terms compared to the more direct speech of the other practitioners.  (Again, consider 
the exchange between the chairman and the hacker, p. 45).  The hacker spoke about the need to 
establish a social contract between the insurgents and the population they sought to represent, for 
example, while the practitioners spoke about the connection to this population not as something 
to be crafted or won but as a given.  Accepting it as given, the practitioners tended to turn 
quickly to political requirements or activities, for example the need to set up an Army to show 
that their insurgent movement was a functioning state.  The practitioners, it emerged, agreed that 
the loyalty of the people had to be maintained but they spoke about this task in what might be 
described as more operational terms (setting up an Army, establishing authority over a territory)  
(pp. 48, 53).  This difference in approach was not just a matter of the words used but appeared to 
be part of a different conception of the problem at hand.  The practitioners’ approach was keyed 
more to typical political considerations than was the hacker’s.   The hacker, more than the 
practitioners, appeared to want to clarify the political framework first and then address specific 
problems. 
  
By the hacker’s own assessment, the disagreement over tactics was in part based on a 
different approach to conceptualizing problems.  When the group was discussing attacking oil 
pipelines, everyone, including the hacker, talked about bombing it.  But the hacker moved from 
this approach to discussing the pipeline as an information system (cf. pp. 58 and 59).  It could be 
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  shutdown, he proposed, by attacking its control system.  This suggestion was not taken up by 
the other practitioners, evidence to the hacker that they did not see that the world was really 
composed of systems and networks and that understanding these was essential.18 
 
Finally, although this did not come up explicitly during the conference, the hacker agreed 
that his interaction with the traditional practitioners pointed to potential organizational problems 
for any hacker-terrorist collaboration.  On those occasions when they do not operate alone, 
hackers operate in flat open-ended associations, while terrorists have often operated in closed 
hierarchical organizations.  It is an open question whether these two organizational styles, 
developed in different operational environments and derived perhaps from different 
psychological needs, can be brought together.  One of the former ETA-PM members stressed in 
his remarks the need to belong and the strength of attachment to the group as characteristic of 
those in clandestine organizations (pp. 33, 106).  These are not necessarily character traits 
typically associated with hackers.  Assuming that they see sufficient benefit in working together, 
could the two kinds of practitioners blend their organizational styles or wholly adopt the style of 
the other? 
 
   The hacker believed that the problems outlined here would arise not only if terrorists 
tried to bring into their organization external hacking talent but even if they tried to develop that 
talent internally.  In effect, his view is that significant hacking talent is not the result of training 
alone but of psychological and intellectual dispositions that if nurtured in an individual in a 
terrorist group would be likely to alienate that individual from the group.  
 
If this encounter at the conference between a hacker and more traditional practitioners 
is at all indicative of general tendencies, it suggests that hackers will have trouble fitting 
into groups of traditional practitioners for psychological, tactical, and organizational 
reasons. 
 
6.  Political Objectives and Mass Casualties, the Conventional Wisdom and a Special Case 
 
The focus on political objectives and legitimacy of the practitioners made CBRN 
weapons unattractive, as the conventional wisdom about politically motivated terrorists predicts.  
None of the practitioners or other participants brought up the use of these weapons on their own 
during the conference.  Only when the control team introduced them to the groups in the 
simulation were they discussed.19  The Chechen group in Chechnya consistently refused to have 
                                                 
18 The hacker maintained that he was unusual in his understanding of the networked and system character of the 
world.  This understanding was one thing that distinguished him from the typical hacker who runs downloaded 
hacker tools at various targets without understanding the systems he is attacking.  To distinguish himself from these 
typical hackers, he referred to himself as an infrastructural warfare specialist. 
19 Means of inflicting mass casualties and of causing cyber damage were supplied to the groups for free on the 
assumption that if the utility of such means appeared great, groups would have a strong incentive to overcome 
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anything to do with them, no matter how adverse the group’s circumstances became, for fear 
that it would destroy popular support and international legitimacy (p. 62).  Some analysts have 
speculated that insurgent groups might want to possess CBRN “to strengthen a contested claim 
to sovereignty by taking on some of the trappings of a state.”20 Although the Chechen group in 
Chechnya continually sought to establish its legitimacy, it did not see the possession of CBRN as 
helpful in this regard.  On the contrary, all members of the group agreed that the possession of 
such weapons would put an end to their hope of establishing Chechnya as a legitimate and 
independent state. 
 
 An important qualification to these generalizations about the instrumental character of 
violence developed rather quickly in the Chechen group based in Moscow.  Initial discussions in 
this group followed the logic of the conventional wisdom, with one academic and one 
practitioner paying particular attention to public opinion.  At this stage, the group was selective 
in its use of violence.  It decided not to target non-combatants, for example, focusing instead on 
the Russian military or officials who were involved in the Chechen war.  When at this stage it 
sought wider effects, it considered sabotage, including attacks on the electrical system and the 
subway in Moscow (pp. 70-71, 81).  Soon, however, the group’s concern with its audience 
diminished, with only the academic consistently reminding the group throughout the simulation 
that it should not forget the effect of its actions on Russian and international opinion.   As the 
group’s concern with public opinion diminished, its willingness to use force increased.  By the 
end of the simulation, the Moscow group was using violence even though there was no hope that 
it would help it achieve its political objective (pp. 98-101).  Violence had become an end in 
itself.  It was no longer merely instrumental.  It was in this context that the group agreed to use a 
chemical weapon (nerve gas) to inflict mass casualties. 
   
By their own account, the Moscow group tended toward violence, ultimately extreme 
violence, because it was the only tool it had.  The scenario put them in a situation in which they 
could not affect public opinion, everything else they did failed, and the control team had told 
them that they were about to be arrested.  As one participant put it, the group’s weakness bred 
extremism (p. 102).  More important, this extremism seemed justified because of what the 
Russians were doing.  The Russians were increasing the pressure on the Chechen population, 
deporting them, shooting those who resisted and importing Russians to replace them in 
Chechnya.  This action by the Russians was taken by the group to be an assault on the Chechen 
nation, an effort, reminiscent of Stalin’s deportation, to destroy the Chechens, a final solution to 
Russia’s Chechen problem.  A consensus developed in the group that this was an act of genocide.  
As such, and given the failure of all other efforts, inflicting mass casualties seemed justified (pp. 
89, 93, 106). 
 
Two different interpretations of this decision are possible.  First, it could be seen as a 
continuation of the logic behind the conventional wisdom.  This logic calls for proportionate 
 
resource barriers to acquire them.  These barriers are significant, of course, and no final estimation of utility in 
possessing or using these weapons can be made without taking them into account.    
20 Richard A. Falkenrath, Robert D. Newman, and Bradley A. Thayer, America’s Achille’s Heel, Nuclear, Biological 
and Chemical Terrorism and Covert Attack, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1998), pp. 207-210.  
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violence and that was what the group, in so far as it was able, engaged in.  With a line of 
reasoning similar to bin Ladin’s, the group argued that the Russians were destroying the Chechen 
nation and thus it was a proportionate use of violence to kill as many Russians as possible. 
   
While plausible, this interpretation is ultimately not satisfactory.  The group decided on 
the gas attack even though it expected that it would provoke even more violence against 
Chechens.  Nor was the group dissuaded from this course of action by the acknowledged 
likelihood that it would destroy sympathy for the Chechen cause in Russia, if any remnant 
existed there, and around the world.  By this point in the simulation, the group believed that the 
Russians were in effect trying to exterminate the Chechen people, if not every single Chechen, 
and that they had been abandoned by the international community.  In this situation, in their own 
estimation, most importantly, they had passed beyond a rational calculation of tit-for-tat 
proportionality (pp. 98, 100). 
 
The second interpretation of this group’s use of nerve gas begins with the recognition that 
when all other means had failed and the threat had risen to the level of the genocide of their 
people and their own imminent demise what was left for this group was not terrorism as 
traditionally conceived but an act of revenge.  As members of the group put it on two different 
occasions, in their self-assessment, they had nothing left to lose (pp. 92, 101-102).  A rough 
analogy exists between the situation that the Moscow group found itself in at the end of the 
simulation and the situation confronted by the Jews who formed Dahm Y’Israel Nokeam (DIN) 
(Avenging Israel’s Blood) after World War II, a group which carried out a mass poisoning of 
German POWs.  As a recent student of this episode explains, those who carried it out were not 
terrorists as we normally conceive of them but members of a special category, “small radical 
organizations representing ‘heavily brutalized communities,’ or populations devastated by 
genocide, ethnic cleansing, or massive destruction. . . .  Facing inevitable destruction or believing 
that life has lost all meaning, they may convince themselves that their sole possibility for self-
assertion is to strike back massively against their executioners.”21  Something like this sentiment 
of self-assertion in the face of disaster, rather than a calculated tit-for-tat response, was behind 
the Moscow Chechen group’s decision to use the nerve gas.   Having made this decision, for 
example, the group speculated about whether any of its members would survive to carry on the 
struggle or even whether the struggle itself would continue (pp. 95, 97, 102).  When the group 




21 Ehud Sprinzak and Idith Zertal, “Avenging Israel’s Blood,” in Toxic Terror, Assessing Terrorist Use of Chemical 
and Biological Weapons, ed.  Jonathan B. Tucker (Cambridge:  MIT Press, 2000), pp. 39-40. 
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The conference simulation supported the conventional wisdom that terrorists with political 
objectives will tend not to cause mass casualties but pointed to an exception, which has an 
analogue in the historical example of the DIN.  If a population appears to be threatened with 
destruction, then a group affiliated with it, especially if it is isolated, failing to affect the larger 




Why the Results are Tentative.  Can They Be Trusted? 
 
 Conclusions drawn from the conference about cyberterrorism and mass casualties should 
be treated with caution because they are based on a small sample of practitioners.   Confidence in 
the results should increase, however, when they are placed in the context of an ongoing research 
project on cyberterrorism initiated by CPI.  As noted, the conference results confirmed several of 
the conclusions of this earlier report and amended others.  In general, the conference results 
suggest a broader role for cyberterrorism than the earlier report did.  Similarly, confidence in the 
conference results should increase when they are placed in the context of terrorism research 
generally.  The conference confirmed the conventional wisdom about mass casualty attacks and 
modified it or highlighted its limitations through the experience of the simulation group based in 
Moscow.  In addition, the conference refined work on innovation in terrorist groups, developing 
a better profile of which kinds of groups will be innovative and under what circumstances.  This 
is an issue essential to any effort to determine which groups might turn to cyberterrorism and 
mass casualty attacks.  
 
 In assessing the results of the conference, it is critical to consider not only how 
representative were the practitioners who attended but also how truthful.  Should we not assume 
that they were simply saying what they thought the conference sponsors wanted to hear or taking 
the opportunity to present their party’s line and thus that the conference results are of little or no 
use?  This question is particularly acute for the two practitioners (the FARC representative and 
the member of the PA), who remain engaged in ongoing political conflicts.   
 
There was, of course, no way to be sure that the practitioners were being truthful in every 
utterance they made during the conference.  Indeed, when given the chance to address plenary 
sessions of the conference, the PLO-PA and FARC representatives spent a significant portion of 
their time conveying the official positions of their organizations.  There were, however, several 
ways to assess whether the practitioners were dissembling.  
 
First, the degree of critical distance from their organizations that the practitioners 
displayed indicates the degree to which they were not simply espousing a party line.  All the 
practitioners except the FARC and PLO-PA representatives displayed such distance.  
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  Second, the practitioners comments can be gauged against the past and present actions 
of their organizations.  The strategy that the FARC representative argued for in the simulation is 
identical to the strategy that the FARC is pursuing in Colombia.  This increased our confidence 
that he was not merely telling us what he thought we wanted to hear.  The PLO-PA 
representative was questioned closely when, in his remarks to a plenary session, he appeared to 
offer an account of the use of violence that did not square with past PLO practice (pp. 12-14).  
This resulted in a more accurate assessment of PLO-PA attitudes.  This kind of assessment was 
done effectively because the academics at the conference had a thorough knowledge of the 
groups represented. 
 
Third, the simulation imposed a set of unavoidable facts on all the participants.  The 
responses of the practitioners were considered in the light of these facts to see if they made 
sense.  
  
Finally, the conference provided a wide variety of formal and informal opportunities for 
discussion and assessment over a three day period.  The more internally consistent the comments 
of a practitioner over this time, especially set against the standard of his organization’s actions 
and the constraints of the simulation, the more confidence we can have in his veracity. 
 
Based on these four tests, it seems fair to conclude that the comments of the practitioners 
were truthful and, in the case of the PLO-PA and FARC representatives, reflected the thinking of 
their organizations. 
 
 The comments of the practitioners shed further light on the degree to which the results of 
the conference can be trusted.  During the group assessments of the simulation, two of the 
practitioners said that the simulation reproduced problems that had occurred in their experience 
of sub-state conflict (pp. 66, 67).  One commented that what was learned in the simulation could 
be the basis for decisions in real life (p. 67).  Yet they also pointed to a way in which a 
simulation is unavoidably different from reality.  They insisted that their decisions to use 
violence selectively were rational, that is, appropriate given their objectives.  They insisted 
equally, however, that in the world of real conflict such a rational approach could be 
overwhelmed by the emotions that the struggle generates.  If your friends are killed by the 
security service, they noted, for example, the desire for revenge could overwhelm a rational 
approach to the use of violence (pp. 66-67, 106).  Also, the struggle can come to be pursued for 
its own sake.  The former ETA-PM member suggested that the pressures of the clandestine life 
forges bonds of friendship that some are reluctant to give up, even if the group appears to be 
achieving its objectives (p. 106, 33).  In general, then, the practitioners concluded that the 
emotional aspects of the violent clandestine life, aspects essential to understanding this kind of 
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  Suggestions for Further Research 
 
As noted in the introduction, the conference was an unprecedented opportunity to learn 
about terrorism and particularly the circumstances under which terrorists might use 
cyberterrorism or try to cause either mass disruption or mass casualties.  In keeping with its 
unprecedented character, the conference generated intriguing insights, for example, into the 
potentially broad appeal of cyberterrorism as a non-lethal weapon and the possibly difficult task 
of combining hackers and traditional practitioners in the same organization.  As noted above, 
these results and the others generated by the conference must be treated with caution.  They are 
important enough, however, to merit further study.  
To that end, we propose convening at least three more conferences.  One would focus on 
the tactical, strategic and organizational aspects of cyberterrorism.  Bringing together hackers 
and individuals who can realistically play the roles of members of sub-state groups, it would 
explore further the utility of cyberterrorism and the issue of combining hackers and traditional 
practitioners in one organization.  This conference would utilize a number of methods, including 
simulations on a closed computer system, to provide information on issues essential to 
understanding the possible future development of cyberterrorism.  These issues include 
 
• Technical details on information attack methodology 
• An understanding of how hackers and practitioners separately would use information 
operations, including data on whether hackers prefer denial of service attacks or 
subversion of information systems and under what circumstances  
• Information on the likelihood of cooperation between sub-state groups and hackers 
and on the likely ways practitioners might try to recruit hackers 
• Information on how the integration of information technology and information 
technicians into sub-state groups might change their strategy, tactics and organization 
• An understanding of the degree to which possessing effective information and 
communication technology decreases the importance of violence in sub-state conflict 
• Information on the scale and scope of escalation when information operations are 
used (is mass disruption useful?) and the factors that influence decisions about the 
scale and scope of escalation 
 
A second conference would convene representatives of groups with a religious 
motivation.  These groups are often said to be more inclined to use extreme forms of violence 
and so would provide a further test of the hypotheses derived from the first conference about the 
likelihood of mass disruption and mass casualties.  In addition, evidence suggests that some 
religious groups are among those most interested in using information technology.  This should 
make them a priority subject for further analysis. 
  
Finally, a third conference would collect a different set of practitioners from ethno-
nationalist and revolutionary groups.  This would allow us to further test and better substantiate 
the results of the first conference. 
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  As part of this research effort, we will augment the work of the conferences by 
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